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A Two-Tiered Theory of Consolidation 
and Separation of Powers 
David Yassky 
Not only did the New Deal expand the permissible areas of govern-
mental activity, it also transformed the structure of the Federal Govern-
ment. President Roosevelt's innovations centralized within large bureau-
cracies power that previously had been dispersed among the three 
governmental branches. This consolidation of power fits uneasily into the 
constitutional framework established by the Founders. 
This Note explores the jurisprudential implications of the New Deal 
watershed and elaborates a post-New Deal theory of allocation of govern-
mental power. Part I begins with a discussion of the Federalist theory of 
separation of powers. l For the Federalists, two conditions ensured an ef-
fective separation. First, governmental branches must be institutionally in-
dependent; each must be free from control by the others. Second, the 
branches must be functionally specialized; each must wield a distinct com-
ponent of governmental power, so that the assent of all three is required 
for government action. 
Until the New Deal, the Supreme Court incorporated this theory into 
its jurisprudence through the nondelegation doctrine, which limited the 
discretionary authority of administrative agencies. The Court displaced 
this limitation in the late 1930's and early 1940's with a series of decisions 
approving massive delegations of authority to the executive branch. 
Contemporary separation of powers analysts dispute the meaning of the 
Court's repudiation of the nondelegation doctrine. Separation of powers 
"purists" insist on maintaining strict boundaries among the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial functions, while "partialists" emphasize the balance 
of power among institutionally independent branches. 
Part II presents an alternative, two-tiered theory. According to this the-
ory, the non delegation doctrine's demise was accompanied by the birth of 
a "consolidation principle" requiring concentration of the government's 
operational power within administrative agencies. Such consolidation must 
1. In this Note, "separation of powers" refers to a dispersion of governmental authority among 
distinct governmental entities. See infra text accompanying notes 5-11. Contemporary analysts disa-
gree sharply over the precise features inherent in, or required by, such dispersion, see infra Part I, 
Section C, but the definition adopted here is intended to capture the common core of the various 
conceptions of separated powers employed by commentators and by the Court: power spread among 
many hands, not concentrated in one. 
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be sufficient to permit activist regulation. At the same time, the traditional 
principle of separation of powers remains vital, though limited in scope. 
The "separation principle" provides the theory's second tier: The ultimate 
power of control over agencies must be divided among the original three 
branches. 
Part III explains the Burger Supreme Court's two landmark separation 
of powers decisions2 as motivated by this two-tiered approach. The 
Court's rejection of the legislative ve.u illustrates the consolidation princi-
ple. The veto was an attempt by Congress to interfere with the ability of 
administrative agencies to pursue interventionist agenda. In contrast, the 
Court demonstrated the continued force of the separation principle by in-
validating the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget balancing law.3 Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings represented a congressional attempt to exclude the 
President from participation in ultimate control over the agencies. 
Part IV, applying the two-tiered framework elaborated in earlier Parts 
to an issue of current importance, argues that portions of the Competition 
in Contracting Act" (CICA) are unconstitutional. Like the legislative veto, 
CICA disrupts the consolidation of operational power within administra-
tive agencies. 
Finally, Part V offers some normative justifications for a two-tiered 
theory. 
I. THE CHALLENGE: THE LEGACY OF THE NEW DEAL 
The Constitution has traditionally been read to embody a theory of sep-
aration of powers. I> In Federalist Nos. 47-51, Madison establishes the link 
between liberty and a struggle for power among governmental institutions: 
"[W]here the whole po~ver of one department is exercised by the same 
hands which possess the whole power of another department, the funda-
mental principles of a free constitution are subverted."6 To safeguard 
against unconstitutional abuses of government authority, the Founders 
limited the Federal Government's ability to act by dividing its power 
among distinct branches.7 Any of the branches, by refusing to exercise its 
share, can prevent government action that violates the Constitution. 
2. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (overturning Gramm-Rudman-HoIlings deficit reduc-
tion act); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring legislative vetoes unconstitutional). 
3. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,99 Stat. 
1038, 1063-93 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1988». 
4. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. V 1987). 
5. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) Uackson, j., 
concurring); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 
DaIl.) 14, 18-19 (1800) (opinion of Chase, j.). 
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis in origi-
nal). This passage is quoted approvingly in the Supreme Court's most recent separation of powers 
decision. Mistretta v. U.S., 109 S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989). 
7. Although the Constitution divides power among three branches, this Note is concerned only 
with the relationship between Congress and the President. Broadening the argument to include Fed-
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A. Two Aspects of the Separation of Powers 
The Federalist identifies two aspects of an effective separation of pow-
ers. First, the branches must be institutionally independent so that no 
branch can fall under the control of the others. Federalist No. 51 sets out 
the structural requirements for institutional independence: "[T]he mem-
bers of each [branch] should have as little agency as possible in the ap-
pointment of the members of the others .... [And] the members of each 
[branch] should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others for 
the emoluments annexed to their offices."8 
Second, the branches must be functionally specialized. Each branch 
must be given a meaningful share of power so that the government can act 
only with the willing participation of all three. The Federalist envisions 
that these functional assignments will be related to each branch's institu-
tional competence, resulting in specialization and an efficient division of 
labor. The Congress, due to its high degree of representativeness and ac-
countability, will best understand the "passions"9 of the electorate, suiting 
it best to articulate basic policy norms. The more removed, statesmanlike 
President will "reason right about the means of promoting [goals deter-
mined by the legislature]."lo The completely insulated, life-tenured Fed-
eral judiciary will "have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment 
"11 
B. The Rise and Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
From the beginning of the Republic until the New Deal period, the 
Supreme Court gave expression to this Federalist theory of separation of 
powers through the nondelegation doctrine, which held that the lawmak-
ing power delegated by the people to Congress in the Constitution could 
not be redelegated by Congress to the executive.12 The Court recognized 
that the President would exercise discretion in administering the laws, but 
insisted that congressional enactments cabin this discretion with specific 
instructions. 
This position is exemplified by J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United 
eral courts is beyond the scope of this Note. Some implications for the judiciary are suggested infra at 
note 55. 
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). These requirements are 
effected by the Constitution in the incompatibility clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, d. 2, the appoint-
ments clause, id. art. II, § 2, c1. 2, and the presidential and judicial compensation clauses, id. art. II, § 
1, d. 7; id. art. III, § 1. 
9. THE FElJERALlST No. 49, at 317 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis omitted). 
10. [d. No. 71, at 432 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original). 
11. [d. No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original). 
12. See generally G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 365-71 (1986) (discussing rise and fall of nondelegation doctrine). For early statements of the 
nondelegation doctrine, see Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1,42-43 (1825); Cargo of the 
Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813) (permitting embargo conditioned 
upon presidential findings); see also cases cited infra at note 17. 
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States.13 Hampton upheld a "flexible tariff' provlSlon authorizing the 
President to adjust import duties to "equalize ... differences in costs of 
production in the United States and the principal competing country."!· 
The Court ruled that this provision did not constitute a "delegation to the 
President of the legislative power»lll because it established an "intelligible 
principle" for the executive to obey.16 By forbidding the President from 
legislating, the nondelegation doctrine both preserved the branches' func-
tional specialization and prevented centralization of power in the 
executive.17 
The Court's reliance on the nondelegation doctrine reached a crescendo 
in the early New Deal period, as President Roosevelt's innovations accel-
erated the concentration of Federal Government power within the execu-
tive branch. Faced with these rapid changes, the Court in Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan18 and in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States19 struck down the New Deal's centerpiece National Industrial Re-
covery Act,20 declaring: "The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to 
transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is ... 
vested. "21 
After the election of 1936, however, the Supreme Court abruptly re-
versed ground, ending its opposition to the New Deal and permitting 
large grants of power to the executive.22 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
13. 276 u.s. 394 (1928). 
14. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 at 941-42, § 315(a). 
15. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 404. 
16. Id. at 409. 
17. Despite its repeated invocations of the nondelegation doctrine, the Court did not actually 
strike down a congressional delegation until the New Deal. See N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United 
States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-26 (1932) (upholding ICC authority to approve mergers); Tagg Bros. & 
Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 436-39 (1930) (upholding authority of Secretary of Agri-
culture to prescribe industry-wide tariffs); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516-21 (1911) 
(permitting Agriculture Secretary to regulate forest preserves); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 
496-97 (1904) (permitting Treasury Secretary to issue standards); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 
(1892) (permitting import duties conditioned upon presidential finding). Perhaps one reading of this 
history would see the nondelegation doctrine as practically meaningless. But this would fail to credit 
the Court's efforts to accommodate the incipient national administrative state within the Federalist 
constitutional framework-until the New Deal expansion rendered the Court's delicate accommoda-
tion untenable. For a description of the development of Federal administrative capabilities during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN 
STATE 47-68 (1982). 
18. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
19. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
20. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (omitted from United States 
Code due to unconstitutionality). 
21. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529. 
22. Professor Ackerman has argued that the election of 1936 effected a constitutional amendment. 
Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1989); Ackerman, 
The StoTrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1051-57 (1984). My argu-
ment in this Note does not require acceptance of Professor Ackerman's thesis, although I find in it 
much to credit. Whether the Court recognized in 1937 that We the People had authorized an activist 
state, or whether the Justices were simply persuaded by the New Dealers' strenuous attacks on the 
philosophical underpinnings of the early Hughes Court's laissez-faire regime, I claim only that the 
Court's separation of powers jurisprudence experienced a major shift in the 1930's and that later 
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Steel Corp. ,23 the Court, without mentioning the nondelegation doctrine, 
upheld Congress' establishment of a National Labor Relations Board with 
complete power to regulate labor unions and labor-management rela-
tions.24 Even Justice McReynolds' dissent takes for granted that the dele-
gation of authority is legitimate: "The precise question for us to determine 
is whether ... Congress by statute [could] direct what the Board has 
ordered."25 
By 1944, the Court in Yakus v. United States26 was willing to permit 
an essentially standardless delegation. Yakus approved a Price Adminis-
trator with the authority to set commodity prices and rents that were "fair 
and equitable" and that would "effectuate ... purposes" including stabi-
lizing prices, preventing speculation, assisting the defense effort, and pro-
tecting people with fixed incomes.27 The Yakus Court contented itself 
with the observation that Congress had "specified the basic conditions of 
fact" necessitating the delegation.28 While the Court never acknowledged 
its repudiation of Schechter/Panama reasoning, it drained the nondelega-
tion doctrine of useful meaning.29 
C. The Contemporary Separation of Powers Debate 
In repudiating the non delegation doctrine, the Supreme Court approved 
centralization of policy-making authority. The task of giving constitu-
tional meaning to this monumental event has raised difficulties for con-
temporary separation of powers analysts, who have identified two ap-
proaches: a pure-separation approach emphasizing "the constitutional 
effort to allocate different sorts of power among three [different] govern-
ment entities" and a partial-separation approach focusing on the "consti-
tutional effort to ... guard against the usurpation of authority by anyone 
branch."30 
decisions have attempted to integrate this shift into the pre-existing framework. 
23. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
24. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987». 
25. Labor Board Cases, 301 U.S. 1,93 (1937) (McReynolds,]., dissenting). 
26. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
27. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 at 23-25, §§ l(a), 2(a). 
28. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424; see also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948) ("A 
constitutional power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect its pur-
poses.") (emphasis in original); United States v. Rock-Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939) (con-
gressional delegations "need specify only so far as is reasonably practicable"); Currin v. Wallace, 306 
U.S. 1, 17 (1939) (delegation to Agriculture Secretary of power to establish standards is "plainly 
appropriate"). 
29. The Court has tacitly acknowledged the New Deal transformation most recently in Mistretta 
v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 655 (1989) (footnotes and citations omitted): "After invalidating in 
1935 two statutes as excessive delegations, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress' ability to delegate 
power under broad standards." The Mistretta Court, relying primarily on Yakus, rejected a nondele-
gation doctrine challenge to a Sentencing Commission empowered to establish sentences for most Fed-
eral crimes. ld. at 654-58. See infra note 84. 
30. G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 342 (distinguishing 
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Scholars in the partial-separation camp see the demise of the nondele-
gation doctrine-and the concomitant concentration of power within ad-
ministrative agencies-as necessitating abandonment of traditional separa-
tion of powers insistence on functional specialization.31 By promulgating 
rules, implementing policies, and making case-by-case determinations, 
these agencies combine all three facets of governance. Partialist commen-
tators contend that modern separation of powers theory cannot, consistent 
with this reality, contain a strict requirement of functional specialization. 
Instead, the partial-separation approach develops the insight that the 
fundamental goal of separated powers is to give each branch a veto over 
government action. This objective requires only that government power be 
divided among independent branches. Rather than policing the branches' 
functional specialization, the Court's role is limited to safeguarding the 
basic structural requisites for each branch's independence and to ensuring 
that none is wholly excluded from the governing process.32 Partialist 
scholars thus support measures to give Congress some control over the 
executive agencies; they deem it more important to counter the threat of 
congressional marginalization posed by the agencies' power than to main-
tain a rigid boundary between the legislative and executive functions.33 
The pure-separation approach, professing fidelity to the Founders' vi-
sion,3. rejects this partialist encroachment on functional purity: "[T]he 
Constitution makes clear that the executive and judicial branches have no 
legislative power; that no part of the judicial power is conferred on the 
legislature or the executive; and that only the executive branch can exer-
"separation of powers" approach from "checks and balances" approach); if. M. VILE, CONSTITU-
TIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 13-20 (1967) (distinguishing between pure and par-
tial approaches); Sargentich, The Contemporary Debate About Legislative-Executive Separation of 
Powers,72 CORNELL L. REV. 430, 434-36 (1987) (distinguishing separation of powers from checks 
and balances); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-ofPowers Questions-A 
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (distinguishing formal and functional 
approaches); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 493-96 
(1987) (same). 
31. See, e.g., G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 12, at 342; 
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578-79 (1984). 
32. Although partialists often refer to the ineradicable bedrock of institutional independence pos-
sessed by each branch as "core functions," this terminology is somewhat misleading. The logical es-
sence of the partialist position only requires that there be bedrock powers, not that these powers have 
any particular functional cast. The three branches might be called the Dodgers, the Giants and the 
Yankees as well as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, provided that each retains a veto 
over government action. 
33. See, e.g., Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater'! A Comment on the Supreme Court's 
Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 789, 812-16. 
34. See, e.g., Burns & Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 PACE L. REV. 575, 
578 (1987); Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the 
Separation of Powers, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 720. Detractors of the pure approach also character-
ize it as originalist. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-1003 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); 
Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision: A Law By Any Other Name'!, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 
(1984). 
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cise executive power."35 The pure-separation approach would therefore 
resist congressional attempts to exercise control over administrative agen-
cies, even at the risk of executive domination.36 Purist scholars either ig-
nore the broad authority possessed by agencies, implicitly denying that 
this authority contravenes the separation of powers,37 or call for a revival 
of the nondelegation doctrine to eliminate agency lawmaking.38 While 
most academic commentators favor a partial-separation approach,39 much 
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has been read as exemplifying a 
pure-separation approach.40 
II. THE SOLUTION: A Two-TIERED THEORY OF ALLOCATION OF 
POWER 
Framing debate between the poles of the pure-separation and partial-
separation approaches compels a choice between functional specialization 
and institutional independence. The pure-separation approach seeks to 
preserve specialization but countenances centralization of power in a sin-
gle branch-the executive. The partial-separation approach permits a 
countervailing increase in congressional power, but only by accepting a 
mixture of functions. Both approaches, then, interpret Jones & Laughlin 
and Yakus as compromising the Federalist principle of separation of pow-
ers by requiring retreat from one of its two aspects. 
I propose instead a two-tiered theory of allocation of power, with one 
set of rules applicable to exercises of power by administrative agencies and 
another set of rules applicable to interactions among the original three 
branches. This theory is motivated by two perceptions: first, that the de-
mise of the nondelegation doctrine constituted a positive affirmation of the 
activist state; and, second, that this affirmation must be understood in the 
context of an overarching system of separated powers. 
A. The Principle of Consolidation of Power 
In a way, my reading of Jones & Laughlin and Yakus goes further 
than either the pure-separation approach or the partial-separation ap-
proach: Not only did these decisions run directly contrary to the Federalist 
principle of separation, but they were animated instead by a principle of 
consolidation. This consolidation principle requires, rather than merely 
35. Burns & Markman, supra note 34, at 579. 
36. See, e.g., Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19,32-34. 
37. See, e.g., id.; Burns & Markman, supra note 34. 
38. See Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 
40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46, 49-65 (Summer, 1976). 
39. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-20 (2d ed. 1988); Bruff, On the 
Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 491, 493-95 (1987); Strauss, 
supra note 30, at 492; Sunstein, supra note 30, at 496. But see, e.g., Carter, supra note 34; Currie, 
supra note 36. 
40. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
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accepts, government agencies that combine legislative, executive, and judi-
cial functions within a single institution. 
In this view, the Court's precipitous shift in 1937 signaled the constitu-
tionalization of an activist regulatory state. The non delegation doctrine 
was inconsistent with this new regime, and so the Court abandoned it. 
But the Court's rejection of pre-New Deal separation of powers jurispru-
dence did not leave a void, permitting Congress and the President to array 
the Federal Government as they saw fit. Rather, the New Deal challenged 
the Court to elaborate a positive vision of a constitutional order based on 
government activismY 
The keystone of this vision is the perception that an activist national 
government cannot be encumbered by multi-branch checks and balances. 
Separated powers, by affording each of three branches the opportunity to 
prevent government action, effectively inhibit regulation. The New Deal 
rejected such constraints, introducing an activist imperative into the Fed-
eral Government's structure. This imperative demands that administrative 
agencies be free to regulate without having to wait for agreement among 
the three branches-without, that is, the restraints of separated powers. 
While the Federalist principle of separation of powers forbids exclusion of 
any of the three branches from the policy-making process, the New Deal 
principle of consolidation of power mandates that this process be the ex-
clusive domain of a single entity.42 The effect of the New Deal is that 
government inaction is no longer the privileged baseline condition from 
which any departure requires the agreement of all three branches; instead, 
intervention is the default position. 
B. Operational Power and Ultimate Power 
At the same time, my interpretation of the demise of the nondelegation 
doctrine finds a greater continuity with Federalist ideals than does either 
the purist or the partialist approach. In recognizing the force of the con-
solidation principle, I do not claim that the Court has superseded, or even 
compromised, the Federalist principle of separation of powers. Rather, the 
Court has resolved the apparent conflict between these two principles 
through a two-tiered theory of allocation of power. 
41. There may indeed have been such a void for a period of time following the Court's New Deal 
reversal. For example, Justice Jackson's "twilight zone" formulation is concerned exclusively with the 
relative powers of Congress and of the President; Jackson appears to assume that there are no consti-
tutional limits to the ability of the two branches jointly to structure government action. See Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) Oackson, j., concurring). I conjec-
ture that in th~ immediate aftermath of Roosevelt's sweeping victories, it may have seemed to the 
Justices that the lesson of the New Deal was that limits on Federal Government structure-enforced 
separation between the legislative and executive powers-had been eradicated. Only over time has the 
Court been able to discern the New Deal's positive dimension, and accordingly to construct new, 
activist requirements. 
42. Not all governmental power must be consolidated, as we shall see. See infra Part II, Section 
B. 
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To reconcile the opposing principles, the Court has had to bifurcate its 
view of government power43 into two distinct spheres of application, one 
employing the principle of separation and one requiring the consolidation 
principle. Bifurcation limits the scope of both the consolidation principle 
and the separation principle, enabling a jurisprudence that accommodates 
both. 
In deciding which principle to apply, the guiding postulate must be that 
the consolidation principle is to apply only to operational power-that 
amount of the government's power required by activist agencies to formu-
late and implement policy. This requirement links application of the con-
solidation principle directly to the New Deal goal of facilitating govern-
ment activism. The separation principle requires division between 
Congress and the President of the ultimate power to govern the agencies 
-to decide how they are to be structured, who is to staff them, what 
areas they are to regulate, and how resources are to be allocated among 
them.44 
In sharpening the distinction between operational and ultimate power, 
care must be taken not simply to equate operational power with the work 
of the administrative agencies. Such a definition would be circular.415 Nor 
can operational power be defined functionally. Dissolving power into 
functional components is useful only if it is to be shared by differentiated 
actors.46 But administrative agencies must be self-sufficient; they must be 
able to exercise all of the functional aspects of power. 
These two dead ends point out that the essential characteristic of the 
authority possessed by administrative agencies has nothing to do with how 
the agencies are structured and nothing to do with the forms by which 
they exercise authority, but it has everything to do with the power rela-
tionship between the agencies and the private actors they regulate. This 
suggests a definition of operational power based on the object of power: 
Operational power includes all exercises of power aimed directly at pri-
vate individuals or groups, while ultimate power is exercised over other 
governmental actors.47 This distinction gives effect to the consolidation 
43. By "exercises of power" I mean to refer to any authoritative statement as to the orientation of 
the state or of state actors towards private individuals or groups, other state actors or entities, or 
foreign persons or entities. 
44. Compare this formulation with M. VILE, supra note 30, at 329-39 (describing tension be-
tween coordination and control in government). See also Strauss, supra note 31 (three original 
branches share control of administrative agencies). 
45. If the consolidation principle requires operational power to be centralized within executive 
agencies, and operational power is defined simply as the work of those agencies, then the consolidation 
principle will, by definition, always be satisfied. For the consolidation principle to be meaningful, 
operational power must be defined without reference to the institutional structures on which the prin-
ciple acts. 
46. Indeed, legislation (or execution or adjudication) is a sensible concept only in relation to other 
modes of exercising power. 
47. Although limited to the sphere of ultimate power, within that sphere the separation principle 
can be retained in its full vigor by dividing ultimate power among branches that are both institution-
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principle, but not at the expense of separated powers; the point at which 
the separation principle obtains has simply been pushed back so that not 
all policy-making authority need be divided. Control of the bureaucratic 
apparatus, but not particular administrative initiatives, requires agree-
ment among the original branches. 
The distinction between operational power and ultimate power is best 
elaborated through case law, and my discussion in the following Part III 
may provide some illumination.48 But a potentially confusing issue should 
be clarified at the outset: One component of ultimate power is the ability 
to determine what areas of society are to be regulated. The consolidation 
principle does not guarantee the jurisdiction of any particular administra-
tive agency, nor the satisfaction of any particular societal need or interest. 
So defined, the distinction between operational power and ultimate power 
may appear to collapse: The ability to set regulatory goals, one might 
think, surely subsumes the ability to structure the policy-making process 
for accomplishing those goals-the ability, in other words, to draw the 
line between operational and ultimate power. I insist, however, that the 
branches do not have a free hand in structuring policy-making processes. 
The consolidation principle constrains: If an area is to be regulated, 
power to regulate autonomously must be centralized within the agencies. 
Congress and the President may not agree to divide operational power. 
This, I now argue, is the lesson of INS v. Chadha.49 
III. EVIDENCE FOR A Two-TIERED THEORY: THE BURGER COURT 
DECISIONS 
Twice near the end of its tenure, the Burger Supreme Court struck 
down important legislation purporting to allocate power between Con-
gress and the President.50 Because the language of these opinions empha-
sizes rigid boundaries between the executive and legislative branches, they 
have been received by both purists51 and partialists52 as evidencing a pur-
ally independent and functionally specialized. Thus Congress should oversee the agencies in a way 
that is distinctly legislative, the President should exercise her share of ultimate authority in a way that 
is distinctly executive, and Federal courts should review agency decisions in a way that is distinctly 
judicial. For a suggestion as to what these restrictions might look like in the case of Congress, see J. 
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 90 (1980) ("Ex Post Facto and 
Bill of Attainder Clauses ... [are] separation of powers provisions, enjoining the legislature to act 
prospectively and by general rule"). 
48. See infra text accompanying note 60 (power to deport aliens is operational power); text ac-
companying note 83 (power to allocate funding among agencies is ultimate power); note 71 (power to 
restructure administrative agencies and power to allocate funding are ultimate powers). 
49. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring legislative vetoes unconstitutional). 
50. [d.; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (overturning Gramm-Rudman-HoIlings deficit 
reduction act). 
51. See, e.g., Burns & Markman, supra note 34, at 590-93; Carter, supra note 34, at 731-36; 
Currie, supra note 36, at 30, 33. 
52. See, e.g., Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 776 (White, J., dissenting); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967-1003 
(White, J., dissenting); Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 323 (1987); 
Strauss, supra note 33, at 794-80; Sunstein, supra note 30, at 493; Tribe, supra note 34, at 1-3. 
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ist, "distinctly non-New Deal"53 VISIon of separated powers. Actually, 
these cases provide strong support for the hypothesis that the Court has 
responded to the New Deal by creating a two-tiered doctrine of allocation 
of power. 54 The Court in INS v. Chadha applied the consolidation princi-
ple to strike down an attempt by Congress to exercise operational power. 
In contrast, Bowsher v. Synar displays the continued vitality of the sepa-
ration principle-limited in scope to cases involving ultimate power-by 
ensuring that Congress shares with the President the power to allocate 
funding among agencies (see Figure 1).55 
Figure 1 
Case Type of Power Principle Employed 
at Stake by Court 
Chadha operational consolidation 
Bowsher ultimate separation 
A. The Legislative Veto Case 
In Chadha, the Court struck down a portion of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).56 The INA grants to the Attorney General (the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is part of the Justice De-
partment) discretion to suspend deportation of an otherwise deportable 
alien,57 but a "legislative veto" provision enabled either house of Con-
53. Aman, Introduction, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 421, 426 (1987). 
54. I cannot plausibly suggest that any of the Justices joining the majorities in Chadha and Bow-
sher, much less the author of the majority opinions, explicitly subscribes to the two-tiered theory of 
allocation of power that I have outlined. Indeed, the originalist rhetoric of the opinions gives no 
indication of a principle of consolidation, or of a distinction between operational and ultimate power. 
Nonetheless, it is part of my argument that the intuitions of the Justices who decided these cases were 
shaped importantly by a recognition of the two-tiered structure of the post-New Deal Federal Gov-
ernment. This claim is corollary to my contention that the Court's turn-around in 1937 announced a 
new and enduring constitutional principle. My argument is not simply that Chadha and Bowsher are 
consistent with the two-tiered theory, but that these decisions were compelled by the Court's effort to 
integrate the New Deal's constitutionalization of government activism into the preexisting framework 
of separated powers. 
55. Two other Burger Court separation of powers decisions are worthy of mention. Both concern 
the authority of officials outside the Federal judiciary (so-called "legislative courts") to adjudicate 
individual disputes. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (permitting 
CFTC to decide state-law counterclaims); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50 (1982) (declaring bankruptcy courts unconstitutional). Without attempting a full-scale 
application of the two-tiered approach to the judiciary, I suggest that these decisions must be under-
stood as differentiating between operational power and ultimate power. Part of the operational power 
indispensible to administrative agencies is the ability to apply law to individual cases in the first 
instance. The CFTC's claim to this power as necessary to its regulatory program is vindicated in 
Schor. At the same time, the ability of Article III courts to exercise the ultimate power to adjudicate 
the constitutionality of agency structure and procedures cannot be eviscerated; this concern drove the 
decision in Northern Pipeline. 
56. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 166 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1988». 
57. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988). Congress directed the Attorney General to suspend deportation in 
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gress, by majority vote, to overrule such a suspension.58 The Court invali-
dated this provision as violating the bicameral passage and presentment 
requirements of Article I of the Constitution. 59 
Commentators err by accepting at face value the purist rhetoric of 
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion. In fact, Chadha is not at all con-
cerned with the separation of powers; it is driven instead by the consolida-
tion principle. The legislative veto is unconstitutional because it enables 
Congress to exercise some of the operational power that should be central-
ized within the INS. 
The deportation power qualifies as operational under the two-tiered 
definition. It is intimately bound up with the day-to-day process of inter-
action between the INS and the private individuals it governs. More gen-
erally, discretionary power over deportation is essential to the INS' ability 
to regulate citizenship. Any INS effort to carry out immigration policy on 
its own would be completely hamstrung if the INS were forced to gain 
congressional assent to each use of the only tool at its dispo-
sal-deportation. To avoid this danger, the Court recognized, the deporta-
tion power must be consolidated within the INS. 
My rebuttal to the conventional misreading of Chadha is twofold. First, 
I want to debunk the surface illusion that the case is only about proce-
dural constraints on Congressional action.6o Chadha-indeed any decision 
about how Congress can exercise its power-necessarily depends on an 
analysis of the limits of Congress' power in relation to the executive 
branch. Second, I want to show that the Court's implicit analysis of these 
limits cannot be understood as protecting the separation between Congress 
and the President, but only as guaranteeing consolidation of operational 
power within an administrative agency. 
1. Explaining the Chadha Opinion 
The Chadha decision appears to rest on its definition of legislative ac-
tion. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger quotes extensively from 
Article I and from The Federalist to establish that all legislative acts must 
be passed by both houses of Congress and be presented to the President 
for signature or veto.61 But while legislation certainly requires bicameral 
cases of "extreme hardship" or "extremely unusual hardship." Id. 
58. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244, 66 Stat. 163, 214-17 (1952), 
repealed by Immigration Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-525, §2(q)(I)(b), 1988 
U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2609, 2614. 
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2: "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President .... " 
60. My analysis of Chadha draws on the following articles: Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Adminis-
trative Constitution, the Constitution and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131-44; 
Sargentich, supra note 30, at 468-77; Strauss, supra note 33, at 794-801; Tribe, supra note 34, at 
3-18. 
61. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945-51. 
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passage and presentment, the Court's argument begs the real question of 
whether the veto is indeed legislation.62 In dissent, Justice White offers an 
alternative characterization. He portrays the veto resolution not as an in-
dependent legislative event but as part of a comprehensive process that 
begins with Congress' delegation, continues through the INS' administra-
tive determinations, and is completed (case-by-case) by either Congress' 
veto or its tacit consent.63 
Choosing between these competing characterizations requires an in-
quiry into the veto device's consequences for the allocation of power be-
tween Congress and the President. This inquiry is absent from the 
Chadha opinion. Instead, Burger provides a simplistic definition of legis-
lation that is both overbroad and circular: The veto resolution is legisla-
tion because it "alter[s] the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons."64 
This formulation is overbroad because executive rulemaking, agency de-
terminations, and judicial decisions all alter legal rights, yet none comply 
with Article I requirements for legislation. More fatal, as Professor Elliott 
observes, the "legislative veto 'alters legal rights' . . . only because the 
Court chooses to characterize its effect that way."65 By treating a deport-
able alien's legal right to a suspension as perfecting prior to congressional 
failure to veto, Burger assumes his conclusion. 
Ultimately, then, Burger's characterization of the veto as legislative 
rests on his statement that "[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively 
exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it."66 Burger's cir-
cular definition of legislation makes this presumption dispositive. As Pro-
fessor Sargentich notes: "[T]his analysis appears to collapse the concepts 
of the action involved (lawmaking) and the actor undertaking the action 
(Congress)."67 The true focus of Chadha is not the definitional bounda-
ries of the legislative function, but the limits imposed by Congress' rela-
tionship to the executive branch. 
2. Chadha as an Application of the Consolidation Principle 
Commentators who reach this point, realizing that Chadha rests on an 
unstated analysis of the appropriate allocation of power between the legis-
lature and the executive, assume that the holding is motivated by a con-
cern to further the separation between the legislative and executive pow-
62. Burger concedes that not every congressional action is to be considered legislation. Id. at 952. 
The language of Article I itself contemplates non-legislative congressional action: "Every Order, Reso-
lution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be neces-
sary .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
63. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 994-95 (White, J., dissenting). 
64. Id. at 952. 
65. Elliott, supra note 60, at 134; see also Sargentich, supra note 30, at 471 (demonstrating 
circularity of Chadha's definition of legislation); Strauss, supra note 33, at 796 (same). 
66. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 95l. 
67. Sargentich, supra note 30, at 472. 
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ers.6S But the internal logic of this putative Chadha position simply does 
not make sense. The legislative veto does not contravene Federalist divi-
sion-of-power interests; rather, it furthers them. Most administrative 
agencies, including the INS, are controlled by the President.69 Denying 
Congress the legislative veto ensures that policy-making will be dominated 
by the President. In the context of a government composed primarily of 
large executive bureaucracies, the legislative veto would result in an un-
easy sharing of power by Congress and the President-exactly the Feder-
alist prescription. 
To put this point another way, Chadha demonstrates that the Court 
has bifurcated its understanding of governmental power. Justice White's 
dissent points out that, far from being "a sword with which Congress has 
struck out to aggrandize itself at the expense of the other branches," the 
legislative veto merely allows Congress to retain some control over policy-
making.70 If the Court held a single-tiered view of governmental power, 
Justice White would surely be correct; the veto enables some redress for 
what is otherwise an imbalance of power in favor of the executive. 
The Court's two-tiered approach, however, means that not every power 
imbalance is to be redressed. Specifically, operational power wielded by 
administrative agencies need not be dispersed; indeed, it must be consoli-
dated. The Court will step in to ensure division only when the ultimate 
power of control over these agencies threatens to become concentrated. Be-
cause the Court in Chadha is concerned with operational power, not ulti-
mate power, it applies the principle of consolidation.71 
68. See, e.g., Burns & Markman, supra note 34, at 590-93; Carter, supra note 34, at 739; Elli-
ott, supra note 60, at 146-47; Sargentich, supra note 30, at 469-70; Tribe, supra note 34, at 17. 
69. The two-tiered theory does not demand that agencies be located in the executive branch. The 
consolidation principle requires only that operational power be centralized within administrative 
agencies, not that it be wholly under presidential control. Congress has some flexibility in structuring 
the precise relationship between the agencies and the President. Agency location can, however, present 
separation-principle problems. See infra note 84. 
70. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974 (White, J., dissenting). 
71. Chadha was written too broadly, however, because not all legislative veto structures would be 
unconstitutional. Some exercises of government power-those involving ultimate power-are properly 
made contingent upon interbranch agreement (under the separation principle). Because the consolida-
tion principle applies only when operational power is at stake, the legislative veto is unconstitutional 
only when used to exercise operational power; a veto exercised in an area of ultimate power-for 
example, the budget power or the power to restructure administrative agencies-would be valid. CJ. 
Strauss, supra note 33, at 805-17 (distinguishing between constitutional "political" vetoes and uncon-
stitutional "regulatory" vetoes). 
There is some indication that lower Federal courts have appreciated this distinction in post-Chadha 
legislative veto cases. One issue in Chadha was the severability oC the legislative veto. The Court 
could have used the unconstitutionality oC the veto to invalidate the Justice Department's discretionary 
power over deportation. Instead, the Court chose to sever the veto provision from the remainder of the 
INA, leaving intact its broad delegation of authority to the Justice Department. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 
931-35. But see id. at 1013-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting on ground that veto not severable). This 
result is compelled by the consolidation principle-because the deportation power is operational and 
must be leCt with the INS-and the general rule has been that vetoes are severable. See Alaska Air-
lines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678 (1987) (severing veto in duty-to-hire statute). 
This rule makes sense in most legislative veto cases, because the power at issue is operational and 
must be given to administrative agencies. But where the power at issue is ultimate power, severing a 
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The premise underlying Chadha-that the power to suspend deporta-
tions is operational, and therefore subject to the consolidation princi-
ple-becomes evident in Burger's response to a nondelegation doctrine 
challenge to the INA. After dismissing the challenge, citing Yakus,72 the 
opinion then declares that "Congress' authority to delegate portions of its 
power to administrative agencies provides no support for the argument 
that Congress can constitutionally control administration of the laws by 
way of a congressional veto."73 Burger's objection to the veto is not that it 
fails to meet the procedural requirements of Article I but that it permits 
Congress to meddle in the work of administrative agencies. 
Chadha is comprehensible-and defensible-only as a vindication of 
the consolidation principle." The legislative veto is offensive not because 
it permits centralization but because it interferes with centralization. In 
violation of the consolidation principle, the veto makes every exercise of 
governmental power contingent upon interbranch agreement. 
B. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Case 
While Chadha demonstrates the Supreme Court's endorsement of the 
consolidation principle, Bowsher v. Synar76 shows that the principle of 
separation continues to play an important role in the Court's jurispru-
dence. In Bowsher, the Court invalidated portions of the Balanced Budget 
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,76 popularly known as 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. This Act authorized the Comptroller General 
to direct Federal spending reductions in the event that the annual budget 
passed by Congress failed to meet specified deficit targets. 
The Court held that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings gave the Comptroller 
legislative veto provision will centralize power that ought to be divided; in such cases, courts should 
strike down the entire statute. Cf. Note, Resolving Challenges to Statutes Containing Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Veto Provisions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1808, 1820-31 (1985) (severability issue 
should be resolved according to importance to Congress of power involved). Two courts of appeals, in 
cases involving ultimate power, have diverged from the general rule and invalidated statutes rather 
than leaving in place broad delegations of authority to the executive. City of New Haven, Conn. v. 
United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invalidating statute giving President broad power to 
revise budgetary allocations by impounding funds); EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(invalidating statute delegating to President power to reorganize agencies). But see Muller Optical Co. 
v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) (upholding change in agency structure pursuant to Reorgani-
zation Act without considering severability issue). 
72. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16. 
73. [d. at 954 n.16. The connection Burger draws between delegation and administration mirrors 
the relationship between the demise of the nondelegation doctrine and the birth of the consolidation 
principle: The New Deal eliminated one set of constitutional constraints on Federal Government 
structure (non delegation) but it replaced the obsolete doctrine with a new set of structural require-
ments incorporating the idea of consolidation. 
74. Readers who find my reading of Chadha in tension with what they consider to be Chief 
Justice Burger's ideological predispositions should note that the majority opinion was joined by J us-
tices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, and Stevens. 
75. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
76. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 1063-93 (current version codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 
(198B». 
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General, an officer of Congress, powers analogous to an unconstitutional 
legislative veto: unilateral lawmaking by Congress without bicameral pas-
sage or presentment to the President. Chief Justice Burger's majority 
opinion begins by citing Chadha for the proposition that Congress may 
not perform executive duties: "To permit an officer controlled by Con-
gress to execute the laws would be, in essence, to permit a congressional 
veto."77 The rest of the opinion establishes the two premises for a viola-
tion under this proposition: that the power to order budget cuts is an exec-
utive responsibility78 and that the Comptroller General is in fact con-
trolled by Congress.79 
The latter claim has been hotly disputed both by academics80 and by 
the other Justices writing opinions in Bowsher.81 Burger's assertion that 
the Comptroller General is a congressional agent is founded entirely on 
Congress' ability, by joint resolution (which must be signed by the Presi-
dent), to remove him for cause. Burger makes no inquiry into the actual 
relationship between the Comptroller General and members of Congress. 
In light of the tenuous (arguably nonexistent) control Congress has over 
the Comptroller General, Justice Blackmun is justified in questioning the 
77. 478 u.s. at 726. Incidentally, this quotation provides further support for the reading of 
Chadha advanced earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 60-74. The Bowsher Court's restate-
ment of the Chadha holding makes clear that the Court-in retrospect, at least-found the legislative 
veto offensive due to the power it gave Congress over the administrative agencies. 
78. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732-33. 
79. ld. at 727. 
80. See Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 323 
(1987); Levinson, Balancing Acts: Bowsher v. Synar, Gramm-Rudman.Hollings and Be)'ond. 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 535-37 (1987). 
81. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 739 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 777 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); id. at 770-75 (White, J., dissenting) (Comptroller General is "one of the most indepen-
dent officers in the entire federal establishment . . . . [Congress' alleged control is) wholly 
chimerical."). 
Burger's characterization of the Comptroller General's responsibilities under Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings as executive is equally subject to attack. The majority opinion states: "Interpreting a law 
... to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law. Under [the Act) 
the Comptroller General must exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the 
Act." ld. at 732-33. But as Professor Elliott notes, this definition is "utterly vapid and without con-
tent." Elliott, supra note 80, at 326. Interpretation of the law and judgment concerning facts would 
seem, if anything, to be hallmarks of the adjudicative function rather than the executive. 
Burger's choice is especially interesting because classifying the Comptroller General's budgetary 
powers as legislative rather than executive would have disposed of the case immediately. Given that 
the Comptroller General is considered to be an agent of Congress, a delegation of legislative authority 
would present a case identical to Chadha. 
The Court could easily have taken this course. The powers given to the Comptroller General are 
just as "legislative" as the Chadha veto, if not more so. The budget cuts mandated by the Comptroller 
General replace resolutions that would otherwise need to be passed by Congress. Further, budgeting, 
unlike immigration policy, begins and ends with the legislative process; it has no administrative com-
ponent. The Court's choice to call the Comptroller General's powers "executive" signals a crucial 
difference between the analytic underpinnings of Chadha and Bowsher. Chadha involved operational 
power, and therefore applied the consolidation principle; Bowsher involved ultimate power, trig~ering 
the separation principle. The rhetoric of the two cases, however, is precisely backwards. With the 
legislative veto, Congress improperly involved itself in administration, notwithstanding the Chadha 
opinion's emphasis on defining "legislation." In Bowsher, though the opinion devotes its analysis to 
defining the executive function, the power at stake is much closer to legislation. 
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"sense of invalidating legislation of this magnitude in order to preserve a 
cumbersome, 65-year-old removal power that has never been exercised 
and appears to have been all but forgotten until this litigation."82 
The answer to Justice Blackmun's question is that Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings' delegation of budgeting authority was unconstitutional whether 
the Comptroller General is considered to be an agent of Congress or an 
agent of the President, or even the head of an administrative agency (the 
General Accounting Office). In contrast to Chadha, Bowsher concerns ul-
timate power. Unlike the deportation power, which is a direct exercise of 
policy-making authority over the clients of an administrative agency, the 
budget acts on administrative agencies; it decides what areas of society the 
government will regulate, and sets priorities among these areas. Conse-
quently, exercise of the budget power is governed by the separation 
principle. 
Unlike the consolidation principle, which demands centralization, the 
separation principle requires that power be shared among the branches. 
Neither Congress nor the President may exclude the other from budget-
ing. Further, the budget power may not be delegated to an administrative 
agency; such delegation would concentrate power Just as much as if Con-
gress or the President were to gain complete control. 83 The status of the 
Comptroller General, then, was irrelevant to Bowsher's outcome. Central-
ization of budgeting power doomed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, rather 
than the particular allegiance of the officer under whom power was con-
solidated. While Chadha applied the consolidation principle in the context 
of an exercise of operational power, Bowsher involved a violation of the 
separation principle in its sphere of appropriate application-the exercise 
of ultimate power8' (refer again to Figure 1). 
82. [d. at 778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
83. In this sense, a "neo-nondelegation doctrine" has survived the New Deal as a component of 
the separation principle: Congress retains a nondelegable share of ultimate power. 
84. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Buckley Court declared 
unconstitutional the structure of the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) because Congress ap-
pointed a majority of its voting members. This structure violated the separation principle. The ap-
pointment power-a power exercised over agency personnel, not over non-governmental actors-is 
ultimate power, and the separation principle requires its division. Allowing one branch to control 
appointment of agency heads would consolidate all governmental power, not just the operational 
power required for activism. 
It might seem that the FEC's commission structure perfectly satisfied separation principle impera-
tives by giving each branch a voice. But the authority to appoint a majority of the FEC empowered 
Congress to render the President's contribution nugatory in the event of a conflict between the two 
branches. The separation principle forbids such an arrogation; each branch must retain a veto over 
exercises of ultimate power. The Court recognized this dictate by suggesting that the FEC be re-
formed so that Congress and the President would jointly appoint a majority of its members. [d. at 
143. 
Recently, the Court again confronted issues of agency control in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. 
Ct. 647 (1989). Mistretta upheld the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,18 U.S.C. § 3551-3580 (Supp. 
V 1987).28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. V 1987), which created a Sentencing Commission staffed in 
part by Federal judges. The Court recognized that the judges staffing the Sentencing Commission will 
not be acting qua Federal judges, and therefore will not be subject to control by the Supreme Court 
other than through the ordinary processes of judicial review; consequently, there is no danger that the 
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The true doctrinal foundation of the Bowsher decision is reflected in the 
Court's key statement of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings' flaw: "The executive 
nature of the Comptroller General's functions under the Act [remember 
that Burger has previously stated that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is inva-
lid if it gives the Comptroller General executive responsibilities] is re-
vealed in § 2S2(a)(3) which gives the Comptroller General the ultimate 
authority to determine the budget cuts to be made."sli It is this exercise of 
"ultimate authority" by a single institution that established a constitu-
tional violation. 
Note, however, how difficult it was for the Court to arrive at the Bow-
sher holding. The Court's failure to develop explicitly the two-tiered 
structure of constitutional restrictions on the Federal Government left no 
doctrinal tool available to invalidate a delegation to the executive-short 
of reviving the nondelegation doctrine, which the Court was unwilling to 
do. This explains why Burger reached so far to classify the Comptroller 
General as a congressional official: To challenge Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, the Court was forced to rely on a dubious removal argument. 
IV. ApPLYING THE Two-TIERED THEORY: THE COMPETITION IN 
CONTRACTING ACT 
Similar doctrinal contortions will undoubtedly continue to plague the 
Court as it is presented with difficult cases involving the allocation of 
power between Congress and the executive branch. For example, Bowsher 
cast doubt on responsibilities assigned to the Comptroller General in as 
many as forty-five statutes,S8 including the Competition in Contracting 
Act (CICA)S7 which gives the Comptroller General a limited authority 
over government procurement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recently upheld the constitutionality of CICA in Lear Siegler, 
Inc., Energy Products Division v. Lehman.s8 As I will show, however, 
CICA violates the consolidation principle. My discussion of CICA will 
suggest how courts may usefully apply the two-tiered theory when decid-
ing future cases. 
In addition, examining the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding CICA 
will illuminate the pitfalls created for lower courts by the disjunction be-
ultimate power of control over the Commission will be concentrated in the Court. See Mistretta, 109 
S. Ct. at 665-66 (Commission "is not controlled by or accountable to members of the Judicial Branch. 
The Commission ... [is] "an independent agency, not a court .... "). 
85. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733. 
86. See Ameron v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 1002-06 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(Garth, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1218, cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988). 
87. Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2701, 98 Stat. 1175, 1199-
1203 (codified in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. and 41 u.s. C.; controversial bid protest and stay 
provisions codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 (Supp. V 1987». 
88. 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), modified by Nos. 86-6496, 87-5698, 87-5670 (9th Cir. July 
17,1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, 9th file); see also Ameron, 809 F.2d at 988-98 (upholding consti-
tutionality of CICA). 
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tween the Supreme Court's rhetoric and the actual two-tiered constitu-
tional framework. The erroneous Lear Siegler decision highlights the 
need for the Supreme Court openly to confront the New Deal 
transformation. 
A. Factual Background 
Congress enacted CICA in 1984 in an attempt to exercise control over 
the Federal procurement process. Congress has found Federal agencies, 
defense agencies in particular, to be persistent in awarding negotiated 
sole-source contracts89 despite Congress' repeated expressions of prefer-
ence for competitive bidding.90 CICA permits disappointed bidders to 
bring claims of agency noncompliance with competitive bidding proce-
dures to the Comptroller General for review.91 
Although the Comptroller General's recommendations carry no legal 
force, CICA stays a contract award until the Comptroller General's inves-
tigation is complete.92 Stays are intended to prevent agencies from circum-
venting the Comptroller General's intervention by rushing to begin execu-
tion of a contract upon the receipt of a bid protest.93 The duration of the 
stay is limited to ninety days,9' however, and the agency may override the 
stay under "urgent and compelling circumstances."95 
B. The Unconstitutionality of CICA 
The first step in assessing CICA is to note that operational power is at 
issue. The ability to make procurement decisions is an essential prerequi-
site for agency independence in policy implementation. By permitting the 
Comptroller General to manipulate stay duration, CICA allows direct in-
terference with the procurement decisions of executive bureaucrats. This 
gives Congress the ability to frustrate virtually any agency initiative.98 
89. S. REP. No. 50, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2174, 2179-82. 
90. See 10 U.S.C. § 2305 (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1982). 
91. 31 U.S.C. § 3552 (Supp. V 1987). 
92. [d. §§ 3553(b)-3553(c). 
93. HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, THE PRESIDENT'S SUSPENSION OF THE COMPETI-
TION IN CONTRAcrlNG Acr IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, H.R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 
(1985). 
94. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-463, § 8139, 1988 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2270, 2270-47 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §3554(a)(I». This 
limitation was enacted, according to its sponsor, to remove any "legal cloud over the constitutionality" 
of CICA. 134 CONGo REC. Sl1,542 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cohen). 
95. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(2) (Supp. V 1987). 
96. This assertion relies on two factual premises, neither of which may be empirically supporta-
ble. First, it assumes that the Comptroller General is an agent of Congress. But see supra notes 80-82 
and accompanying text. Second, it assumes that the Comptroller General's CICA stay powers signifi-
cantly hamper agency procurement initiatives. But these powers are quite limited. See supra text 
accompanying notes 94-95. Perhaps the potential interference with agency functions is de minimis, 
and thus inoffensive. Note, however, that in even a moderately fluid market environment the ability to 
stay contract execution enables the Comptroller General to prevent agencies from taking advantage of 
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Like Chadha's legislative veto, CICA destroys the consolidation of power 
by subjecting procurement policy to the joint control of Congress and the 
executive agencies.97 
The consolidation principle does not eliminate a congressional role in 
oversight of the agencies. It does, however, forbid Congress from unilat-
eral oversight. Congress is certainly able to direct the Comptroller Gen-
eral to investigate procurement decisions and to make recommendations. 
But in order to effect these recommendations, Congress must gain the as-
sent of the President. CICA overstepped this limitation by giving the 
Comptroller General a tool-the stay provisions-with which to force ex-
ecutive assent. Divesting the Comptroller General of the authority to vary 
stay duration would deprive him of this tool and restore the proper bal-
ance between consolidation and separation. 
C. The Lear Siegler Opinion 
The Lear Siegler court fails to make this analysis, and the reasons for 
its error are instructive. The opinion acknowledges that CICA's stay pro-
visions affect procurement, but nonetheless declines to invalidate the law. 
Lear Siegler interprets Bowsher's "ultimate authority" language to permit 
Congress to influence administrative agencies as long as it stops short of a 
total arrogation of power.98 Because the Comptroller General's eventual 
recommendations lack legal force, the court argues that CICA leaves final 
procurement decisions to executive agencies and that the scope of the 
Comptroller General's power does not violate the "ultimate authority" 
standard. 
Lear Siegler correctly perceives that a notion of ultimate authority is at 
the heart of the Bowsher holding. But the court misunderstands the phrase 
by appreciating only one of its two meanings. First-as Lear Siegler does 
understand-"ultimate authority" expresses the standard of review em-
ployed by the Court in Bowsher: Legislation is unconstitutional if it ex-
cludes the President entirely. But-and this is what Lear Siegler 
misses-this standard is not applicable to every case. Where operational 
power is at stake, restraints on congressional intermeddling are much 
stricter; under the consolidation principle, any interference is offensive, 
even if the President is not completely shut out. 
That is the second meaning of "ultimate authority": It describes the 
sort of policy-making power that implicates the principle of separation 
favorable market conditions. This gives the Comptroller General powerful bargaining leverage with 
which to force agency compliance with congressional procurement objectives. 
97. For alternative appraisals of CICA's constitutionality, see Burns & Markman, supra note 34, 
at 593-98; Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1253,1289-93 (1988); Weitzel, GAO Bid Protest Procedures Under the Competition in Contracting 
Act: Constitutional Implications After Buckley and Chadha, 34 CATH. D.L. REV. 485 (1985). 
98. Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1108 ("critical issue is whether Congress or its agent seeks to 
control (not merely to 'affect') the execution of its enactments") (emphasis in original). 
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rather than consolidation. Bowsher properly applied the "ultimate author-
ity" standard of review because the case involved the ultimate power of 
budgeting. In contrast, the Comptroller General exercises operational 
power under CICA. By failing to recognize this distinction, the Lear Sie-
gler court mistakes the type of power at issue in CICA, and it applies a 
correspondingly mistaken standard of review. Put another way, the appro-
priate precedent is Chadha, not Bowsher, because CICA, like the legisla-
tive veto, allows Congress to interfere directly with the decisions of gov-
ernment bureaucrats (see Figure 2).99 The Ninth Circuit's failure to 
distinguish between the two Supreme Court decisions is not surprising in 
light of the Court's own confused rhetoric. Lear Siegler stands as a chal-
lenge to the Court to set out clearly the conceptual framework underlying 
its separation of powers holdings. 
Figure 2 
Case Type of Power Principle Employed 
at Stake by Court 
Chadha, CICA operational - correct 
--
consolidation 
Bowsher ultimate 
-
correct 
--
separation 
Lear Siegler operational - incorrect 
--
separation 
v. CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PRINCIPLE 
OF CONSOLIDATION 
Thus far I have endeavored to make two central points. My first claim 
is that the Court's abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine signalled 
the New Deal's repudiation of a Federalist conception of separation of 
powers. Second, I claim that to fill the doctrinal void left by the demise of 
the non delegation doctrine, and to give effect to the vision of activist gov-
ernment affirmed by the New Deal, the Court has developed a two-tiered 
theory demanding both that administrative agencies be sufficiently power-
99. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), is also interesting in this connection. Morrison 
upheld the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
521,92 Stat. 1867 (independent counsel provisions codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. V 1987». 
This Act established a procedure for appointing a special prosecutor to investigate and litigate charges 
of misconduct by executive branch officials. Some analysts interpreted the special prosecutor as a 
congressional aggrandizement of power that is properly the executive's. Morrison, however, correctly 
applies the two-tiered theory in vindicating the Act. The critical fact ignored by the Act's detractors is 
that the prosecution of official misconduct is an exercise of ultimate, not operational power; the special 
prosecutor's actions are directed at government officials, not private citizens. Rather than leave such 
prosecution decisions entirely within the hands of Justice Department officials, the separation princi-
ple calls for dispersion of authority among all three branches. The Act accomplishes this with a 
finely-wrought scheme conditioning prosecution on action by Congress, the Attorney General, and a 
"special division" of a Federal court. Critics of the Morrison decision make the Lear Siegler error in 
reverse: Because they mistake Morrison for a case involving operational power, they incorrectly apply 
the consolidation principle. 
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ful to regulate autonomously and that control over the direction and shape 
of the administrative state be divided between Congress and the President. 
Even readers who accept these contentions may nonetheless resist a 
two-tiered theory on normative grounds. In particular, the consolidation 
principle is likely to meet opposition based on a Federalist argument that 
consolidated power spells tyranny: Power must be divided so that the gov-
ernment will be "oblige[d] ... to control itself."loO 
But this view is no longer valid; it hinges on an untenable distinction 
between government action and government inaction. Those who consider 
the Constitution to guarantee positive rights-the right to freedom from 
discrimination for example, or the right to educationlol-will certainly 
agree that rights can no longer be thought to rest on government inaction 
(or, at the very least, that rights are no more likely to be vindicated by 
government inaction than by activism).102 
Even tho~e who reject a broad reading of constitutional rights must 
recognize the enduring lesson of the New Deal period that the "natural" 
system of common law market regulation is not prepolitical. l03 This rec-
ognition renders anachronistic a theory of political rights preferencing 
government inaction. The two-tiered theory builds on the insight that gov-
ernment action should not be conceptualized as change from some private, 
prepolitical baseline. Rather, government action should be treated as part 
of the background. 
Because administrative agencies do not change drastically on their 
own,104 however, the political theory I am suggesting is not as dissimilar 
to the Federalist theory as it may appear. It calls for a revisim of the 
separation of powers, not a rejection of it. In the Federalist view, sepa-
rated powers enable each branch to veto government action it thinks un-
constitutional. The view of the two-tiered theory is somewhat different: 
Each branch can veto a change in the status quo that it deems unconsti-
tutional. The slow rate of internally-driven agency change gives meaning 
to the separation principle's check on the exercise of ultimate power. The 
Federalist bias against action is transformed into a bias against change. 
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
lOt. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 7-19 (1969) (Constitution guarantees 
"minimum welfare"); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 659; if. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986) 
(suggesting that some constitutional rights might be characterized as positive). 
102. Professor Mashaw adds justifications for activist agencies based on wealth maximization and 
on governmental legitimacy. See Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why A.dministrators Should Make Political 
Decisions, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 81, 91-99 (1985). 
103. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("[Wjhether the law of the State 
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of 
federal concern."). 
104. Political science literature is rife with claims that the pace of bureaucratic change is incre-
mental. See, e.g., H. KAUFMAN, ARE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS IMMORTAL? (1976); S. KEL-
MAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY 109-10 (1987). 
